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We use the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters to characterize the dynamics of expectations at the 
micro level. We find that forecasters (i) have predictable forecast errors; (ii) disagree; (iii) fail to 
systematically update their forecasts in the wake of new information; (iv) disagree even when 
updating; and (v) differ in their frequency of updating and forecast performances. We argue that these 
micro data facts are qualitatively in line with recent models in which expectations are formed by 
inattentive agents. However building and estimating an expectation model that features two types of 
inattention, namely sticky information à la Mankiw-Reis and noisy information à la Sims, we cannot 
quantitatively generate the error and disagreement that are observed in the SPF data. The rejection is 
mainly due to the fact that professionals relatively agree on very sluggish forecasts. 
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cycle  
 




Nous utilisons l’enquête «  Survey of Professional Forecasters  » conduite par la BCE, un panel 
trimestriel, afin de caractériser la formation des anticipations des prévisionnistes professionnels. Nous 
mettons en évidence plusieurs faits : (i) le caractère prévisible des erreurs de prévision; (ii) un degré 
significatif de désaccord entre prévisionnistes; (iii) l’absence de révision systématique  : chaque 
trimestre, environ un quart des prévisions ne sont pas révisées; (iv) un niveau de désaccord significatif 
même parmi les experts qui révisent leurs prévisions (v) une hétérogénéité entre les experts du panel 
dans la fréquence de révision des anticipations et dans leur performance prédictive. Ces faits sont 
qualitativement cohérents avec les modèles théoriques reposant sur l’hypothèse d’”inattention” comme 
ceux de Mankiw et Reis, ou de Sims.  
Dans un second temps, nous élaborons et estimons un modèle empirique qui englobe ces deux types 
de spécification de l’inattention. Nous obtenons toutefois que ce modèle est quantitativement rejeté : il 
ne permet pas de rendre compte simultanément du niveau de désaccord et du niveau de persistance de 
l’erreur de prévision présents dans les données. Compte tenu du degré de désaccord observé, le modèle 
prédit des prévisions beaucoup moins inertes que celle observées : à l’origine de ce rejet est donc un 
certain consensus des experts sur des prévisions inertes. 
 
Mots-clefs: Anticipations, prévisions d’experts, information imparfaite, inattention, erreur de 
prévision, désaccord, cycle macroéconomique. 
 
Codes JEL: D84, E3, E37  1 Introduction
Models in which imperfect information and the formation of expectations act as a transmission
mechanism of economic ﬂuctuations—in the spirit of Friedman (1968), Phelps (1968) and Lucas
(1972)—have recently regained interest in the macroeconomic literature.1 Imperfect information
has, in particular, been related to the inattention of agents to new information, a behavior that
can be rationalized by costly access to information and limited processing capacities.2 One appeal
of these models is to provide an alternative channel to sticky prices to explain the persistent eﬀects
of transitory shocks, and in particular monetary shocks, on the economy. Moreover, this approach
can parsimoniously account for patterns of individual expectations observed in survey data that
are at odds with the standard perfect information rational expectation framework, namely that
forecast errors are predictable and forecasts diﬀer across forecasters.3
In this paper, we exploit the panel dimension of such a survey of forecasts, namely the ECB
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), to produce new micro facts characterizing the formation
of expectations. We then elaborate on those characteristics to assess whether models of inattention
accurately describe the behavior of forecasters and thus may contribute to a better understanding
of business cycle ﬂuctuations. To be consistent with the recent literature we consider two types
of inattention models. On the one hand, sticky information models developed by Mankiw & Reis
(2002) and Reis (2006a,b) in which agents update their information set infrequently but get perfect
information once they do. On the other hand noisy information models proposed by Woodford
(2002), Sims (2003) and Ma´ ckowiak & Wiederholt (2009) in which agents continuously update their
information but have an imperfect access to it at each period.
The ECB-SPF is a quarterly panel starting in 1999 surveying around 90 forecasting units in either
public or private institutions. Professional forecasters may not be representative of less sophisti-
cated agents, since professionals obviously allocate substantially more time, human, collecting and
computing resources to the task of forecasting macroeconomic variables. However professionals’
1See, among others, Woodford (2002), Hellwig & Veldkamp (2008), Angeletos & La’O (2009) and Lorenzoni (2009).
Imperfect information is also crucial in the recent welfare analysis of information. See, among others, Morris & Shin
(2002), Angeletos & Pavan (2007) or Adamor & Weill (2009). Veldkamp (2009) and Mankiw & Reis (2010) provide
surveys.
2See Mankiw & Reis (2002), Sims (2003), Reis (2006a,b) and Ma´ ckowiak & Wiederholt (2009).
3See for example Mankiw, Reis & Wolfers (2003).
3opinion has been shown to spread to other types of agents and therefore inﬂuence expectations
and decisions of ﬁrms and households (Carroll, 2003). Furthermore we may expect professional
forecasters to be the agents in the best position to pay attention to the relevant macroeconomic
information. As a result, the extent of attention to news among professional forecasters can be seen
as an upper bound for other agents’ attention to aggregate conditions.
We highlight ﬁve main categories of micro facts from these SPF data that we argue are consistent
with professional forecasters behaving as if they were inattentive. First, the forecasts of experts
exhibit predictable errors and systematic bias. Second, experts disagree as they report diﬀerent
predictions for the same variable at the same forecast horizon. Moreover, the disagreement between
forecasters evolves over time. Third, agents do not systematically update their forecasts even when
new information is released. Fourth, the forecasters who update also disagree on their forecasts.
Five, the frequency of updating a forecast, the average forecast error and the revision of forecast
vary across individuals.
To our knowledge, the present study is the ﬁrst to document infrequent updating in survey forecasts.
The originality of our approach is to exploit the fact that the European SPF provides sequences
of individual forecasts for the same event (variable and date). We can therefore construct a direct
micro-data estimate of the frequency of updating a forecast. The results show that, on average, each
quarter, only 75% of professional forecasters do update their 1-year or 2-year forecasts while the
macroeconomic environment evolves. The frequency of updating has a structural interpretation:
it corresponds to the degree of attention, a key parameter in a sticky-information type of model.
Furthermore, identifying forecasters that update their forecasts, we also uncover that they too
disagree. Thus the lack of information updating is not the sole responsible for disagreement among
experts. Even when updating their forecasts, they may not have access to the same information.
This result is in line with the predictions of a noisy-information model. Lastly, the individual
dimension of the data allows us to analyze the cross section distribution of the degree of attention.
We ﬁnd a minimum at 50% and a maximum at 100%. Moreover, the shape of the distribution reveals
that the implied average inattention is not driven by a speciﬁc group of professional forecasters.
We then turn to a formal empirical assessment of inattention models. More precisely, we argue
that the previous results qualitatively support a model featuring two types of inattention namely
4sticky-information ` a la Mankiw-Reis and noisy-information ` a la Sims. We therefore develop such
an expectation model and then use it along with the SPF data to carry out a Minimum Distance
Estimation (MDE). We ﬁnd that this inattention model fails to quantitatively reproduce the ob-
served persistence of the average forecasting errors together with the relatively small disagreement
between forecasters. Moreover, the smoothness observed in the average SPF forecasts would re-
quire a much lower attention degree than our micro data estimates. Such a low attention would in
turn lead to much more disagreement than observed in the SPF data. Therefore, elements others
than the mere inattention included in our expectation model are needed to reconcile both the rel-
atively low disagreement among professionals and the relatively high persistence of the aggregate
forecasting error.
Our paper relates to the vast literature, mostly relying on US data, that studies the behavior of
survey forecasts and compares it with the implications of theoretical expectation models. Numerous
studies (see Pesaran & Weale, 2006 for a recent survey) found systematic aggregate forecast errors
and disagreement in these data, at odds with the perfect information rational expectation frame-
work. We conﬁrm these results for a recent sample period and for European SPF data. We also
complement these results by providing new empirical micro evidence on individual expectations.
Our work is also related to Mankiw et al. (2003), Branch (2007), Coibion & Gorodnichenko
(2008) or Patton & Timmermann (2009) who rely on the characteristics of survey expectations to
assess inattention and, more generally, imperfect information theories. Mankiw et al. (2003) and
Branch (2007) focus on the cross-section distribution of forecasts to calibrate the sticky-information
attention parameter mentioned above. By comparison, we underline the importance of investigating
the consistency of this parameter values with both the cross-section dispersion of forecasts and the
aggregate forecast errors. Furthermore, we improve on their approach by considering a model
which can explain the disagreement among forecasters who update their information set. Lastly,
rather than calibrate it, we estimate the attention parameter using either micro-data estimates or
a MDE procedure. Coibion & Gorodnichenko (2008) look at the conditional response to various
structural shocks of the aggregate error and disagreement implied by surveys to disentangle the
sticky-information and the noisy-information models of inattention. They ﬁnd mixed support in
favor of the two, as we do. The distinctive feature of our analysis is that we estimate a model
5featuring simultaneously the two types of inattention. Patton & Timmermann (2009) rely on the
evolution of forecasts over diﬀerent forecast horizons to stress that diﬀerences in the interpretation of
information, rather than diﬀerent information sets are the main culprit for forecasters’ disagreement.
They leave the source of these diﬀerent interpretations unexplained. The model we consider is an
alternative approach to generate disagreement, that does not rely on “deep” heterogeneity among
forecasters.
Our paper is moreover closely linked to several recent contributions that rely on aggregate time
series to estimate the attention degree in a sticky-information model of inﬂation dynamics (Kiley
2007, D¨ opke et al. 2008, Coibion 2010). When signiﬁcant, the results imply a frequency of updating
a forecast ranging from 10% to 30%, well below the ﬁgure of 75% we obtain. That we rely on a panel
of professionals could explain part of the discrepancy, since these agents may update more frequently
their forecasts than other types. However many of these recent studies (for instance D¨ opke et al.
2008, Coibion, 2010) also use professional forecasters’ expectations to perform their estimation. The
discrepancy is thus also related to the methodology. Studies that use macroeconomic time series
typically rely on auxiliary assumptions on the economy and are subject to aggregation biases. By
contrast, we provide a direct, arguably more reliable, micro-data estimate of this parameter that
is key in sticky information models. Even if we ﬁnd an attention degree that is much higher than
these previous works, it still remains remarkable that professionals do not systematically update
their forecasts.
Finally, our work is related to Klenow & Willis (2007) and Ma´ ckowiak et al. (2009). They rely on
structural models of price setting under inattention and show that several of the distinctive impli-
cations of these models are supported by the dynamics of individual prices (Klenow & Willis, 2007)
or sectoral price index data (Ma´ ckowiak et al., 2009). By comparison, looking at the characteristics
of expectations, we ﬁnd more direct evidence in favor of inattention theories. We also stress some
quantitative limits of the existing inattention models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the European SPF data.
We turn to the facts in section 3. In section 4, we develop a model of expectations that incorporate
both sticky and noisy information and put it to a test. We give some concluding remarks in section
5.
62 Data: the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters
The ECB’s survey of professional forecasters has been conducted every quarter since 1999. The
survey covers around 90 institutions involved in forecasting and operating in the euro area. Each
institution is asked to report, among other things, forecasts for the (year-on-year) euro area inﬂation
rate, real GDP growth rate and unemployment rate for forecasting horizons of one year and two
years.4 Respondents provide two types of forecasts. The ﬁrst one is a ‘rolling forecast’, with a ﬁxed
horizon of one or two years ahead of the last available observation. The second type of forecast is
a ‘calendar horizon’ forecast: in each quarter, forecasters are surveyed about their forecast for a
ﬁxed event, namely the current and next years. In this case, the forecast horizon shrinks as time
goes by. At the time of the writing of this article, the last available survey round is 2010Q2, so
that we have 46 time periods available. These data are matched with the corresponding realization
of the forecasted variable.
The ECB SPF has been rarely used for research purposes so far. It was indeed launched with
the euro and therefore was bound to cover a too short period of time for several years. However,
the ECB SPF has some has some speciﬁc advantages compared to some other survey expectation
data. As will be detailed below (Section 3.4.1), combining these speciﬁcities is crucial to observe
the individual expectation characteristics that relate to models of inattention, in particular the
ones associated with forecast revisions. To start with, the data base is a panel which implies
that one can track the response of a particular individual institution over time. Moreover, the
responses are quantitative rather than qualitative. By contrast, many of the survey that cover
ﬁrms or households are typically repeated cross-sections, and report qualitative data.5 Furthermore,
the number of actual respondents is relatively high (around 60) compared with other surveys of
professional forecasters. This number is for example twice as large as the number provided in
the more widely used US SPF, and leads to arguably more precise estimates of statistics based on
individual expectations (the forecast average, the forecast error variance, the disagreement between
forecasters, the individual probability to update a forecast). Finally, the ECB SPF provides both
4Longer horizon forecasts are also provided but will not be emphasized here. See Bowles et al. (2007) for a
thorough presentation and discussion of the survey.
5Professionals’ forecasts relate to macroeconomic conditions whereas individual agents may be concerned with
forecasting their future idiosyncratic conditions which we cannot assess here. However, in most models imperfect
macroeconomic information will also have an impact on optimal individual decisions.
7‘calendar’ and ‘rolling’ forecasts along with several forecast horizons, namely 4 and 8 quarters, for
both of them. By contrast, the US SPF, provides only 4 quarter ‘rolling’ horizon forecasts.
We now introduce some useful notations. In the case of the rolling horizon forecasts, we denote
fx
it,t+h individual’s i forecast for the variable x at date t, h quarters ahead. The variable x is either
π (the year-on-year inﬂation rate), ∆y (the year on year GDP growth rate) or u (the unemployment
rate). The forecast horizon h is set to 4 or 8 quarters ahead of the last observation of variable x
available at the date of the response to the survey. Importantly there is an observation lag, τx,
between the date of the response to the survey t and the date of the last publicly released ﬁgure of
each macro variable, t − τx + h. The observation lag varies across variables: inﬂation is observed
with a one month lag, unemployment with a two month lag and GDP growth with a two quarter
lag. The survey thus actually collects:
fx
it,t−τx+h.
In practice the SPF reports data for h = 4 or h = 8. For notation simplicity, in the following, we
drop the reference to the observation lag and simply refer to fx
it,t+h.
For the calendar horizon case, the forecast horizon is either the current or the next calendar year.
The horizon is not adjusted for information lag. Letting T be the last quarter of a calendar year




The second term in the equality makes clear that, for each year in the sample, the forecast horizon
T − t decreases with t. For notation simplicity again, we use the notation fx
it,T.
Let xt+h be the realization of the forecasted variable at date t, we denote ex
it,t+h individual’s i
forecast error at date t + h, namely ex
it,t+h = xt+h − fx






it,t+h, with nt the number of respondents to the survey at date t. It can






simply through the equality ex
t,t+h = xt+h − fx
t,t+h.
6For rolling forecasts, the date of the realization takes into account the observation lag τx mentioned above in
order to be consistent with the date for which the forecast is made.
83 Some facts about individuals’ expectations
3.1 Fact 1: Forecasters are biased
The professional forecasters make, on average, predictable errors. This emerges from Figure (1)
which shows, in the left panel, the time series of the so-called consensus forecast for the 1-year hori-
zon7 together with the realizations of the predicted variable, and, in the right panel, the time-series
of the corresponding average forecast error. It is striking to see that periods of under/overestimation
of the target variable realizations are very persistent, and last for more than 1 year, i.e. over time
periods that are longer than the forecast horizon.8
Table (1) further asserts these points by providing descriptive statistics on realizations, average fore-
casts and errors and a test on the predictability of forecast errors. Inﬂation has been underestimated
by an average of .56% (on an annual rate). Real GDP growth has been overrated by an average of
.27%, mainly due to the recent crisis. Finally unemployment exhibits a small underestimation of
about .04% over the period. These systematic biases explain why the root-mean-squared-error of
the forecasts is larger than the variance of the forecasted series.
Systematic biases go along with very persistent forecast errors. Their ﬁrst order auto-correlations
range from .735 for inﬂation to .860 for unemployment.9 The bottom panel of Table (1) also
shows the result of a regression of the average forecast error on the last error known at the date
when the forecast was made (that is h quarters before, with h = 4). For the three variables
(inﬂation, unemployment and output), the coeﬃcients signiﬁcantly diﬀer from zero. Thus, errors
are predictable on the basis of the information set available at the date of forecast. These results
conﬁrm other references on the topic.10
Relationship with models of information rigidity Predictable forecast errors are a predic-
tion of both sticky information and noisy information inattention models. Forecasters are rational
7The consensus is deﬁned as the average of individual forecasts for each date in the sample. The median forecast
across forecasters is very close to this average.
8This is strikingly the case for inﬂation with a systematic average underestimation up to 2006.
9These diﬀerences in forecasting performances do not seem to be related to diﬀerences in the average number of
respondents, which are broadly the same for all three variables.
10See, for example, Andrade & Gregoir (2010) and Coibion & Gorodnichenko (2010) for recent references.
9but exhibit biased average forecasts because they have an imperfect information on the current
state of the economy.
More precisely, in a sticky information model, agents update their information set infrequently
with a probability of updating given and constant across dates and individuals. Therefore, each
date, only a fraction of the population has access to the last vintage of macroeconomic news. The
average forecast is therefore partly made of individual forecasts that are predictable with respect
to the new information set.
In a noisy information model agents update their information but they know that the news they
get is imperfect and therefore only partly pass it onto their forecast. The average forecast thus
incorporates only part of this new information, which makes the forecast error predictable with
respect to the (perfect) information available.11
In the following sections we exploit the panel dimension of the data set to document two other
characteristics of individual forecasts that these approaches imply: disagreement and inattention.
3.2 Fact 2: Forecasters disagree
A second pattern in the data is that forecasts diﬀer among forecasters even though they forecast the
same object. This is illustrated in Figure (2) which plots the sequence of cross-section distributions
of 1-year forecasts for all survey vintages in the sample.12 The distribution never degenerates to a
single peak, which illustrates that disagreement is present at any date. The result is particularly
striking given that forecasters in our sample are experts who presumably have access to the same
information set.
An empirical assessment of the extent of disagreement among forecasters is usually done by calcu-
lating the cross-section standard deviation of forecasts at each date, σx
t , namely, using the notations















11Here it is implicitly assumed that the econometrician can have access ex-post to perfect macroeconomic informa-
tion.
12To save space, we only present the distribution of individual forecasts for real GDP growth but qualitatively
similar results hold for either unemployment or inﬂation forecasts.
10Table (3) reports the time average disagreement, σx
h, for the 1-year horizon rolling forecasts. This
average disagreement is equal to .26 for inﬂation, .26 for unemployment and .33 for real GDP (see
Table 3). Expressing these values as a fraction of the underlying variable standard deviation over
time we obtain a normalized indicator of disagreement of 42%, 43% and 31% for, respectively,
inﬂation, unemployment and real GDP.
Figure (3) shows the time series of disagreement, σx
t,h, for the 1-year horizon rolling forecasts of
the three macroeconomic variables of interest. Disagreement across forecasters is not constant over
time and the three time-series of disagreement have a strong positive correlation.13
It is worth investigating whether this disagreement is completely random—and in particular repre-
sents measurement errors only—or whether it stems from information imperfections, for instance
a slow diﬀusion of macroeconomic news among forecasters. In that second case, the cross-section
distribution of forecasts would spread out after the shocks and then narrow to a new average level.
This phenomenon seems consistent with a crude event study applied to the sequence of forecasts’
histograms of Figure (2). Consider for instance the episode of the cyclical downturn of 2001. The
distribution of growth forecasts, which was very concentrated around 3%, spreads out toward zero
leading to a larger dispersion. Then the distribution narrows again over 2002 and 2003 but around
a lower average of about 2%. Even clearer is the impact of the current recession (years 2008-2009):
along with the recession, the support of the distribution of forecasts widens substantially to the
left, and several local modes appear.
We go further in investigating the link between disagreement and economic news using formal
statistical tests. More precisely, we regress disagreement at time t, σx
t,h, on several rough measures
of shocks hitting the economy: the last absolute variation in the forecasted variable, |∆xt−1|,
the squared last forecast error, (ex








. Results are presented in Table (2) and show that the coeﬃcients
are all positive and most of them are signiﬁcant: disagreement is an increasing function of the
amplitude of the shocks hitting the economy.
This last evidence somehow contrasts with Coibion & Gorodnichenko (2008) who ﬁnd that the
13Relying on rolling-horizon forecasts to evaluate forecasters’ disagreement is important to avoid the seasonal
patterns emerging from the resolution of uncertainty as time gets closer to the forecasted event one gets when relying
on calendar-horizon forecasts instead.
11dispersion of inﬂation forecasts does not react to structural shocks. They however also recognize
that the results are sometimes mixed and seem to come from the fact that these structural shocks
only account for small fractions of inﬂation total time variance.14 By contrast, here we analyze
the unconditional reaction to a mixture of all events that can shock the economy and ﬁnd that the
information implying a change in the level of forecast takes time to spread out among agents.
Relationship with models of information rigidity The results that forecasters disagree and
that the extent of disagreement varies over time can be rationalized by both sticky-information
or noisy-information models of expectations. In both cases, disagreement is a consequence of
imperfect information which implies that agents do not have the same information set.
In a sticky-information model, when a large shock hits the economy, individuals who update their
information set produce forecasts which are quantitatively very diﬀerent from individuals who do
not. These diﬀerences are less pronounced in the wake of a small shock. Consequently, the extent
of disagreement evolves with the magnitude of the shocks hitting the economy.
In a noisy-information setup, forecasters think diﬀerently because they randomly get diﬀerent
perception of reality. In simple versions of this approach, and by contrast with simple sticky-
information models, disagreement does not change with the size of the shocks hitting the economy.15
In these setups, disagreement is initiated by the realizations of the idiosyncratic noise that prevent
individuals from perfectly observing the true state of nature and that are assumed to have a variance
that is constant over time and across individuals. The disagreement is thus not aﬀected by the
size of the macroeconomic shocks hitting the economy. It is however possible to reﬁne this simple
version of a noisy information model such as to generate time-varying disagreement also in this
setup. This would be the case if, for instance, one introduced conditional time variance of the noisy
signal correlated with the size of the true shock, or heterogeneity in the noise among the population
of forecasters so that the ones that monitor the shock the best disagree more with the ones that
have very imprecise signals after a big shock than after a small one.
14Among the several structural shocks they investigate, none account for more 35% of total inﬂation variance, even
in the long-run. Moreover, depending on the horizon, the share of total variance that these shocks altogether cannot
account for ranges from 67% to 47% (see Section 5.2 and Appendix C in their paper).
15This distinction is stressed by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2008).
12All in all, predictable and biased forecasts errors and disagreement among forecasters suggest that
both sticky information and the noisy information models may be good candidates to understand
and describe how expectations are formed.
The next three subsections go further by documenting other patterns in the SPF data, that are
related to the unfrequent updating of forecasts and, as we argue below, can be related to the
inattention of professional forecasters.
3.3 Fact 3: Forecasters do not systematically revise their forecasts
To our knowledge, it is an original contribution of the present paper to document the attention
of professional using individual data. While average forecast errors can be constructed using data
on the average or consensus forecast, and time-speciﬁc disagreement can be assessed using data
sets of repeated cross-sections, our measure of the degree of attention can be built only owing to
the panel data structure of the SPF data set (at least two forecast sets must be observed for each
individual). In this section, we ﬁrst describe this measure, then turn to the results we obtain on
our sample, and ﬁnally discuss the robustness of our indicator.
3.3.1 Measuring the degree of attention
The panel dimension of the SPF data set allows us to build diﬀerent measures of the average
frequency with which an individual revises its forecasts over time. This frequency of updating a
forecast provides a measure of the extent with which agents pay attention to new macroeconomic
information by incorporating it in their forecasts. It corresponds to a structural parameter in sticky
information models, called the degree of attention, i.e. the frequency with which agents update
their information set and therefore, in these models, their forecasts.
More precisely, we consider the quarterly probability of revising the h-step ahead forecast between
date t−1 and t. Letting fx
it,t+h be individual’s i forecast h quarters ahead for variable x at time t,





Assuming that the probability is homogeneous across agents, λx
it(h) = λx
t (h) for all i, we can deliver
13empirical counterparts to this attention degree using the SPF data.
Our ﬁrst indicator relies on calendar horizon forecasts. At all dates, each forecaster is surveyed
about a given calendar year. Recalling that T is the index of the last quarter of a given calendar
year in the sample, the survey brings information on the probability of revision on a quarterly basis
given by
λx
t (T − t) = P(fx
it,T 6= fx
it−1,T).
In practice the ECB-SPF surveys forecasters about their expectations for the current calendar and
the next calendar years, as well as, in the third and fourth quarter vintage of the survey, about their
expectations for two years ahead. Therefore, for each calendar year, say Y, ending in quarter T, we
have a sequence of 10 forecasts: two sets of forecasts made at the third and the fourth quarters of
year Y −2, and 8 sets from the ﬁrst quarter of year Y −1 onwards. Thus we can build a sequence
of 9 forecasts revisions, for the same event T, and forecast horizons h = T − t = 1,...,9. The











with h = T−t = 1,··· ,9, nt the number of respondents to the survey at date t and I(fx
it,T 6= fx
it−1,T)
an indicator function equal to 1 if fx
it,T 6= fx
it−1,T and 0 otherwise.
A second measure of the probability to update a forecast can be derived from rolling horizon
forecasts, exploiting the fact that they are provided for both a 4-quarter and a 8-quarter horizons.
Consider the 8-quarter horizon forecast released at date t − 4 by forecaster i, fx
it−4,t+4. This can
be compared to the 4-quarter horizon forecast released 4 quarters later fx
it,t+4 so as to deﬁne the

















it−4,t+4) an indicator function equal to 1 if fx
it,t+4 6= fx
it−4,t+4 and 0 otherwise. By
contrast with the previous measure, the horizon is bound to 4 quarters due to data limitations. We
therefore skip the horizon index in the notation, referring to b λx
t,rol = b λx
t,rol(4).
14This probability to update compares two forecasts that are 4 quarters away from each other.
It can be converted to a quarterly adjustment rate, b λx
t,rol,q if one assumes that the probability
of not updating is constant over the 4 quarters. In that case, the probability of not updating
over the whole year is (1 − λx
t (4)) = (1 − λx
t (1))4 so that a quarterly attention rate estimate is
b λx





t (h) is constant over time and across horizons, we can also recover micro-
data based estimates of the average attention degrees b λx
cal and b λx
rol,q by simply taking the time
average of the empirical frequencies deﬁned above. These estimates can be compared with the
macro-data estimates of Kiley (2007), Coibion (2010), D¨ opke et al. (2008) or calibration in Mankiw
et al. (2003). In addition to assuming a constant attention degree, these previous works also needed
auxiliary macroeconomic assumptions, such as the price-setting behavior of ﬁrms, to achieve their
estimation. By contrast we provide a more direct estimate based on micro data.
Interpretation of λx
t (h) as a measure of attention deserves further discussion. It could in theory be
the case that a forecaster chooses not to revise his forecast in spite of having updated his information
set. However, given the vast information set available to professional forecasters we deem unlikely
that updating the information set leads to an exactly unchanged optimal forecast after one quarter.
Rather, those cases more plausibly correspond to cases where either the forecaster chooses not to
run a new forecast exercise, i.e. not to pay the cost of processing the new information by running
a full statistical exercise, or not to pay the cost of communicating the new information within
or outside the institution. In both situations, the forecaster chooses to leave his public forecast
unchanged because of information cost. It is therefore relevant to characterize this lack of reaction
to news as (optimal) inattention.16
3.3.2 Results
The ﬁrst result is that the estimated attention degree is lower than 100%: forecasters do not
update systematically their forecasts on a quarterly basis. This can be seen from Figure (4) which
16Alvarez, Lippi & Paciello (2010) describe a model where ﬁrms pay an information cost to calculate the optimal
reset price (i.e. implement a price review) and then decide to pay or not the usual menu cost of changing the price.
Here the forecaster could be seen as paying the price to calculate the optimal forecast but not the one to change the
optimal forecast because of the cost of communicating the reasons of this change.
15presents the estimate of attention b λx
t,cal(h) for the HICP variable. Figures for real GDP growth and
unemployment are not reported to save space but have a similar pattern. Each line in the ﬁgure
reports a sequence of forecast pertaining to the same calendar year TY . There are thus 11 lines
corresponding to calendar horizons from Y = 2001 to 2011. At each point in time, t, b λπ
t,cal(h) is
the proportion of forecasters revising their forecast for a given target calendar year TY ending with
quarter T. The associated forecasting horizon is thus h = T − t. Sequences of forecast revisions
partially overlap since, in each vintage of the survey, respondents are asked their forecast for both
current and next calendar year.
Although attention is not complete, with a probability of forecast revision varying between 60% and
100% depending on the date, t, it is much higher than the values provided by previous empirical
studies. Table (3) shows that the average b λx
cal across horizons and dates is 71% for HICP, 74% for
the unemployment rate and 80% for GDP growth. Averaging across variables the typical degree of
attention is thus b λcal ' 75%. By comparison, Mankiw et al. (2003) calibrated a value of b λ = 10%
for monthly data, i.e. a corresponding b λ = 27% when converted to quarterly data, to reproduce
the disagreement in US-SPF inﬂation rate forecasts.
A second result that stands out from our estimation is that the average probability to revise a
forecast increases when the forecast horizon decreases: all lines in Figure (4) are upward sloping.
Two factors can explain this pattern: ﬁrst, mean reversion implies that long run forecasts are close
to the unconditional average of the process. So that news that lead to revising short run forecast
may leave the forecast at a long horizon unchanged. Second, it may be the case that forecasters
put more attention on revising their forecast for closest forecast horizons. Experiments in the next
section suggest both factors are present.
A third pattern is that the average attention level varies over time. This can be seen from the
average level of each curves in Figure (4) but is even clearer when one looks at Figure (5) which
plots the evolution of the alternative attention indicator b λx
t,rol, over time for the forecasts of the
three variables x and shows that there is a signiﬁcant degree of ﬂuctuations in these parameter.
A fourth and last result stemming from the b λx
t,rol estimate is that forecasters do not update sys-
tematically their forecasts even on a yearly basis. This conﬁrm our ﬁrst result that attention is
not equal to 100% when looking at b λx
t,cal(h) estimates. It is somewhat even more striking since
16here some forecasters choose not updating their one-year ahead forecast even after having learned
one year of macroeconomic news. Table (3) reports the time average attention degree, b λx
rol for the
three macroeconomic variables x in the sample. It is equal to respectively 88% for inﬂation, 95%
for unemployment and 94% for GDP. Converting these average probability of forecast revision to
quarterly ﬁgures gives frequencies, b λx
rol,q, of 41%, 53% and 51%. Averaging across variables x one
gets b λrol,q ' 48%. The diﬀerence between this result and the average b λcal ' 75% is further evidence
that the frequency of updating is not constant over forecast horizons. Our assessment is that b λcal
is the most reliable indicator. Indeed, in practice, 8-quarter rolling horizon forecasts are usually
not a conventional exercise implemented by professionals. Moreover, since calendar forecasts are
available for adjacent quarters, it is more likely that they compare forecasts delivered by the same
forecaster.
Relationship with models of information rigidity That forecasters do not update their fore-
casts at each period is a prediction of sticky-information models of expectations. In this approach,
agents updating their information systematically also update their forecasts so that not revising a
forecast is equivalent to not revising information.17 On the contrary, the presence of non-updating
in the data is not a direct consequence of noisy-information models. Individuals receive an imper-
fect signal on the true state of the economy, but at each period they try to infer this imperfectly
observed state incorporating the news they received. Forecasts are thus revised at each period.
Our results also show that the attention degree varies over time. By contrast, the sticky information
model of Mankiw & Reis (2002) postulates that λ is constant. Observing ﬂuctuations in aggregate
attention is not a direct evidence against the sticky information model of Mankiw-Reis. Indeed it
could be reconciled with the more general model of inattention proposed by Reis (2006a) which,
under some restrictions, aggregates to a Mankiw-Reis model in which inattention can be described
by a single parameter. Note however that also we ﬁnd a degree of attention that also varies with
the forecasting horizon as shown in Figure (6) which violates these conditions of aggregation.
17A more stringent prediction of these models is that the full stream of future forecasts is unchanged when a
forecaster does not update his information set. However, this model does not predict that a forecaster may only
revise part of this stream, so that revising a forecast for a particular horizon implies revising for the whole stream.
173.3.3 The inﬂuence of rounding
Almost all forecasts (97% of forecast ﬁgures) in our data set are reported with one digit only. Failure
to revise a forecast may thus merely reﬂect the fact that these institutions report only rounded
ﬁgures.
Rounding in our context can be interpreted in two diﬀerent ways. First, one can consider rounding
as a form of inattention. Indeed it is not formally requested by the ECB SPF questionnaire that
ﬁgures are provided with a single digit, so providing rounded ﬁgures may reﬂect the cost of pro-
cessing and communicating the information discussed above. Under an alternative interpretation,
there is widespread acknowledgement that higher order digits are not economically meaningful, or
the forecasters expect that a rounded ﬁgure is requested by the survey. Rounding would then lead
to underestimate the degree of attention.
To obtain a quantitative assessment of the inﬂuence of rounding on our estimation results, we
perform the following experiment. We use an estimated VAR model as a simulation and forecasting
device, drawing shocks from a multivariate distribution with a covariance matrix equal to that of
the estimated innovations.18 We start by simulating a large sample of artiﬁcial observations of
length S using this VAR model (S = 2000). We then generate a number S of recursive sets of
forecasts, up to a 12 quarter horizon, for each date in the simulated data set. Consistently with
the way ﬁgures are reported in the SPF survey, we aggregate forecasts for quarterly inﬂation and
GDP growth into forecast for annual year-on-year growth rates. We then round each forecast to the
ﬁrst digit. Using the data set of rounded forecasts, we compute the probability that two adjacent
forecasts, corresponding to the same forecast horizon (i.e. the same target date) are diﬀerent.
We are able to compute such a quarterly frequency of forecast revision for all horizons h = 1 to
h = 9. Crucially, in our simulation exercise, inattention is absent from the forecasting model:
actual forecasts are updated every period in line with the VAR model. As a result, the probability
of not updating the forecast is here an estimate of the bias to our measurement of attention that
is due to rounding. The magnitude of this bias will obviously depend on several parameters of the
exercise: the horizon considered (we expect more bias at longer horizons due to mean reversion),
the size of the innovation variance (larger shock will imply lower bias since forecast revision will
18See Section 4.1. for a description of the estimated VAR model.
18be too large to be wiped out by rounding) and the persistence of the process (low persistence of
shocks will imply fast mean reversion thus less forecast revision).
The results for inﬂation are plotted in Figure (6). The estimated probability of updating a forecast
is 83% for the horizon h = 9 quarters and rises to 91% for the horizon h = 1. These ﬁgures are
lower than one, which suggest there is actually a rounding bias. The probability also increases
when the target date gets closer, rationalizing the pattern of Figure (4). However these ﬁgures
are at all horizons markedly above the estimates of attention we recover from actual SPF micro
data, as seen in Figure (6) for the calendar forecast revision case. Thus, independently of rounding
eﬀects, there is a degree of supplementary inattention in professional forecasts.
3.4 Fact 4: Forecasters who revise disagree
The panel data set allows us to observe at each date the number of forecasters updating their
forecast. We further exploit this speciﬁcity of the database in order to document the behavior of
the forecasters when they update their forecasts.
We computed at each date in the sample the disagreement among forecasters that do revise their
forecast. To get a sense of its importance, we compare it with the disagreement among all forecast-
ers. Figure (7) gives a scatter plot of the level of disagreement in the whole population of forecasters
on the x axis against disagreement among the set of forecasters that have revised their forecast at
the same date on the y axis. Each observation in the plot corresponds thus to one date and one
variable. They are all close to the 45 degree line. The correlation between the two disagreements
is thus strongly positive, as high as 97%. At each period, the overall level of disagreement is very
similar to the level of disagreement among revisers.
We also investigate whether forecasters update forecasts for several macroeconomic variables at the
same time or balance their updating across dates and variables. More precisely we compute (over
all observations) and for each variable (inﬂation, GDP growth, unemployment) the probability that
the forecast of this variable is revised, conditional on the fact that the forecast of another variable
(inﬂation, GDP growth, unemployment) has been itself revised. Figures are reported in the bottom
panel of Table (3). The notion of forecast revision considered here is the rolling horizon forecast
(not converted to quarterly ﬁgures). Figures for the conditional probability of revision range from
190.877 (probability of revising inﬂation forecast given that unemployment forecast was changed) to
0.951 (probability of revising unemployment forecast given that inﬂation forecast was changed).
Recalling that the unconditional probability of forecast revision range from 0.88 (for inﬂation) to
0.95 (for unemployment), the probability of revising a forecast is thus of the same order whenever
forecasts of other variables have been revised.
Relationship with models of information rigidity A prediction of sticky-information models
is that forecasters who revise their information set will draw the same optimal forecast and thus
should not disagree. Therefore this approach cannot explain the large degree of disagreement among
forecasters updating their forecast we ﬁnd. By contrast, noisy-information models can generate
disagreement between forecasters who revise since every of them has a speciﬁc information due to
the heterogenous signals on the true state they receive.
In both approaches, the inattention can be rationalized by resorting to the assumptions of limited
computational capacity or costly information. In this logic of rational inattention, forecasters could
face a trade-oﬀ in the degree of attention devoted to the alternative variables. The strong positive
correlation at the individual level between the forecast revisions of the diﬀerent variables shows
this is not the case. Once a forecaster update his information set, he tends to update his forecasts
of every macroeconomic variable.
3.5 Fact 5: Forecasters are heterogeneous
The SPF data set ﬁnally allows to investigate the cross-section properties of individual forecasts.
We ﬁnd that forecasters are heterogenous in terms of their average forecast error, their average
attention degree and their average forecast revision.









with Ti the number of forecast observations available for individual i. The top panel in Figure
(8) reports the cross section distribution of these individual average bias for 1-year ahead rolling
inﬂation forecasts. On average, professionals underestimated the inﬂation rate but some of them
20were more optimistic and some others were more pessimistic. There is thus a systematic pattern
in disagreement since the average forecast bias diﬀers across experts, with substantial dispersion
between individuals. The individual average bias ranges broadly from -1% to 1%.19 The histogram
also enlightens that disagreement does not come from some outlier professionals.
We also compute a measure of the attention degree for each individual forecaster. To do so, we
assume an attention degree λx
it(h) = P(fx
it,t+h 6= fx
it−1,t+h) that is homogenous across dates t,
λx
it(h) = λx
i (h). We can then estimate this individual speciﬁc attention degree as the percentage of










The middle panel of Figure (8) plots the cross-section distribution of λx
i (h) for the 1-year rolling
inﬂation forecasts. The conclusion is that the degree of attention varies across forecasters. Though
there is a mass of forecasters with values of λi above 80%, the dispersion is substantial. The
less attentive among forecasters revise on average their forecasts every 2 quarters while the most
attentive ones adjust every quarter.20
Moreover, as a measure of the extent of forecast revision, we also calculate the average absolute of













The cross-section distribution of the average revision for the 1-year rolling inﬂation forecasts is
depicted in the bottom panel of Figure (8), underlining again substantial heterogeneity around a
mode of .28%.
Finally, we investigate whether diﬀerences in the individual attention degree generate diﬀerences
in both the individual average forecast errors and revisions. We regress the absolute value of the
individual average forecast error, |ex
i,h|, and of individual average forecast revision, |(∆fx
i,h)|, on the
individual attention rate, λx
i (h). Table (4) provides the results for the 1-year rolling forecasts of
19This systematic disagreement pattern can be linked to disagreement stemming from heterogeneity in priors or in
models as Patton & Timmermann (2010) put forth.
20The fact that some forecasters systematically adjust their forecasts also shows that rounding is not the mere
responsible for observing a frequency of forecast revision lower than one. Would it be the case, no forecaster would
systematically update.
21inﬂation, unemployment and real GDP. Strikingly, attention is positively correlated with forecast
errors and forecast revisions.
Relationship with models of information rigidity The cross-section heterogeneity observed
in average individual forecast errors can be generated both by sticky-information and noisy-
information models, postulating that agents have either diﬀerent frequencies of updating their
forecasts or diﬀerent precisions in their noisy signals. This heterogeneity could be rationalized by
resorting to diﬀerent information capacities constraints. However neither model generates system-
atic forecast bias so that the unconditional individual average errors should be zero. The observed
non-zero average forecast errors can only be associated with non-zero in-sample bias due to the
particular history of news over the time sample studied.
Again, only sticky-information models generate a lack of systematic forecast revision. Postulating
heterogeneity in the frequency of updating has the potential to rationalize the heterogeneity in
forecast errors that is also observed. Allowing for heterogeneity in the frequency of updating the
information set may give rise to an aggregation issue. The frequency of updating the information
that is consistent with the pattern of the average forecast across the whole population of hetero-
geneous forecasters would be lower than the average of the individual probability of updating (see
Carvalho, 2006).
Finally, both sticky-information and noisy-information models can generate heterogeneity in the
cross-section of the average size of forecast revisions. In the sticky-information setup, this revision
will decrease with the degree of attention. When forecasters update more frequently their informa-
tion set, they incorporate more frequently the news in their forecast and therefore are subject to
a lower probability of a large revision in the future. This is at odds with the results of Table (4).
By contrast, in the noisy-information framework and for low attention level, i.e. very noisy indi-
vidual signals, the forecast revision can become an increasing function of inattention. Very noisy
signals produce almost no updating of forecasts because forecasters know about their imprecision.
However, this property of the model does not help explain why the frequency of revision increases
the size of the forecast error and the forecast revisions. These results could hint to a situation
where the causal link is reversed: attention increases when forecasters had bad previous forecast
22performances implying large forecast errors and forecast revisions.
4 Models of inattention: a quantitative assessment
The previous section has shown that the SPF data features the two basics ingredients that are in
line with either a sticky information model of expectations ` a la Mankiw-Reis or a noisy information
model ` a la Sims: biased forecasts and disagreement among forecasters. Moreover, forecasts are not
always updated, a prediction of Mankiw-Reis’ model and agents disagree on their forecasts even
when they update their information/prediction, a prediction of Sims’ model. These qualitative
results suggest a model of expectations in which both type of inattention coexist: agents infrequently
update their information set and when do they get a noisy perception of the true information.21
In this section we develop such a model of individual expectation and then assess wether it is able to
quantitatively match the average forecast errors, disagreement and probability to update a forecast
that we observe in the data using a formal testing procedure.22
4.1 A sticky and noisy information model
4.1.1 DGP and information structure
We assume that the economy can be described by the following reduced form VAR(p) model
A(L)Xt = t, t ∈ Z,
where Xt is a set of n macroeconomic variables, centered on their average, L is the lag op-
erator, A(L) ≡
Pp
k=0 AkLk has all its roots outside the unit-circle and A0 = I and where
E{t|Xt−1,...,Xt−p} = 0. The VAR(p) model can be rewritten in the usual more compact ﬁrst-
order VAR companion form
Zt = FZt−1 + ηt,
21This approach shares some features with the price-setting model of Woodford (2009). In this setup, ﬁrms have
to choose on implementing a price review knowing that they will get a noisy information on the true state of the
economy. This leads to optimal non-systematic price review and, when it happens, to reset prices that are determined
conditional on the noisy information.
22Given that we do not have a clear-cut interpretation of what lies behind the heterogeneity of forecasters we
consider a model that disregards this deep heterogeneity.
23with Zt = (X0
t X0
t−1 ··· X0
t−p+1)0 and ηt = (0
t 0··· 0)0.
Let i be an individual in the population of forecasters, i = 1,...,n. At each date, every forecaster
may update his information set or not. Along the lines of Mankiw & Reis (2002), we model this
updating as a Poisson random variable, P(λ). Therefore λ is the probability to update and pay
attention to the news. It is also called the degree of attention. Assuming that the population of
forecasters is large, by the law of large numbers, each date t a fraction λ of the total population
updates its forecast. Consequently, at each point in time, the whole population of forecasters
is split into groups, generations say, within which each forecaster refers to the same vintage of
information. We let j denote the generation of forecasters that last updated their information set
j periods before the current one, i.e. in t−j. Thus j is also an index of the vintage of information
they use. The fraction of generation j in the whole population is given by λ(1 − λ)j. In Mankiw
& Reis (2002) model, every agent updating his information set gets a perfect signal on the state
of the economy Zt. The optimal forecast at horizon h is given by the expectation conditional on
this perfect information, E(Zt+h|Zt) = FhZt. It is therefore identical for every forecaster who
updates. Likewise, the forecasters who last updated in t − j receive a perfect signal on Zt−j and
their optimal forecast for t + h is the conditional expectation with respect to that information
vintage, E(Zt+h|Zt−j) = Fh+jZt−j. So, the Mankiw & Reis (2002) information structure implies
no disagreement within a generation j of forecasters. As the previous section made clear, this is at
odds with the facts.
We therefore extend Mankiw and Reis’ model to include imperfect perception of the information
when updating. More precisely, we assume that, when an agent i updates his information, he gets
a noisy perception of the true state, Zt, namely a signal Yit that follows
Yit = H0Zt + vit, vit ∼ iid(0,Σv),
where H is a matrix that selects the state variables that are observed with a noise.23 Remark that
the average over forecasters gives the right signal: Ei(Yit) = H0Zt. A simple way to rationalize
this noise is to rely on the fact that forecasters use real-time data which they know are prone to
measurement errors.
23A typical case is H = I, in which case forecasters have noisy perceptions of all the state variables. An alternative
would be to consider that forecasters have perfect access to past realizations of Xt.
244.1.2 Optimal individual forecasts
Let fit,t+h denotes agent’s i optimal forecast for the vector X at date t + h, with respect to date t
information (and fx
it,t+h the corresponding expectation for the speciﬁc component x in X). Every
individual updating his information set faces the problem of inferring the true state of the economy,
Zt, from his imperfect signal Yit. Let Zit|t denotes the date t state of the economy perceived by
agent i at date t: Zit|t = E(Zt|Yit,Yit−1,...). Its optimal vector of forecast is given by
fit,t+h = E(Zt+h|Zit|t) = FhZit|t.
A solution to this signal extraction problem is given by the Kalman ﬁlter namely,










where Pit|t−1 denotes the variance of the perceived forecast error,
Pit|t−1 = E

(Zt − Zit|t−1)(Zt − Zit|t−1)0
.
Noticeably, the gain is common across agents, Git = Gt, as soon as one postulates the usual initial
conditions of the recursion, namely that Zi1|0 = E(Z1) and Pi1|0 = E{[Z1 − E(Z1)][Z1 − E(Z1)0]},




Pit|t−1 − Pit|t−1H(H0Pit|t−1H + R)−1H0Pit|t−1

F0 + Σv,
and the recursion is therefore identical across agents when they start from the same a priori Pi1|0.24
Individuals who cannot update their information set at date t stick to their old one, like in a
Mankiw-Reis type model, but with the diﬀerence that past information vintages are noisy. Let
fit−j,t+h be the optimal expectation of an agent i using information vintage j, his optimal forecast
for date t + h is given by fit−j,t+h = E(Zt+h|Zit−j|t−j) with Zit−j|t−j = E(Zt|Yit−j,Yit−j−1,...) the
24That would not be the case if, in particular, one considered a “deep” disagreement involving diﬀerences in the
perception of the parameters value underlying the true state DGP, for instance E(Zi1|0) 6= E(Z1).
25state Zt−j perceived by an agent i that sticks to the information vintage j. The optimal forecast
of individuals that updated j periods ago is therefore given by
fit−j,t+h = E(Zt+h|Zit−j|t−j) = Fh+jZit−j|t−j.
4.1.3 Average forecast and error
Let Eij(·) be the expectation over i and j. The average forecast over the whole population of
forecasters, also called the consensus, is given by
Eij (fit−j,t+h) = Ej [Ei (fit−j,t+h|j)].
That forecast average can be split into the average over individuals using the same information
vintage j, and the average over the diﬀerent generations of forecasters or information vintages.
We consider, without loss of generality,25 individuals using the information vintage j = 0 (i.e.
the generation of forecasters able to update information at the current date). Combining the
Kalman ﬁlter expressions above, we can rewrite the optimal vector of forecasts of individuals in
this generation as





Remarking that Eij(Yit|j = 0) = H0Zt, this leads to the following forecast average within this
generation










Useful insights can be derived from the comparison with the perfect information case. In that case
every individual would have an optimal forecast given by
f∗
t,t+h = Fh+1Zt−1 + Fh (Zt − FZt−1) = Fh+1Zt−1 + Fhηt. (2)
Comparing equations (1) and (2), the diﬀerence between the noisy information and the perfect
information cases stem from two channels. First, the perceived state one period backward is not




. This also implies that the perceived innovation is not the
25Forecasts that were generated at date t − j for the t + h horizon date can be rewritten as forecast at date τ for
the τ + l horizon date, with τ = t − j and l = h + j.




6= ηt. Second, because it is acknowledged to be noisy, the perceived
innovation is not completely incorporated into the forecast: GtH0 6= I. Consequently, the forecast
error associated with the average within a generation is predictable with respect to the information
available at date t. Indeed, let E
j
t,t+h = Zt+h − Ei (fit−j,t+h) be that forecast error, we have
E
j=0





























6= 0 as long as I 6= GtH0.
The optimal forecast for an individual updating his information set at time t is given by fit,t+h
and by fit−j,t+h if the information set was last updated j periods ago. The average of individuals’
across generations of forecasters then follows
Ej [Ei (fit−j,t+h|j)] =
∞ X
j=0
(1 − λ)jλEi (fit−j,t+h).






, the average forecast error, i.e. the error associated with the consensus
forecast, we have
Et,t+h = Zt+h − Ej [Ei (fit−j,t+h|j)]













Taking the expectation with respect to the true state, Zt leads to










which shows that the average forecast error is predictable, i.e. E(Et,t+h|Zt) 6= 0, as long as I 6= GtH0
and/or λ < 1.
4.1.4 Disagreement between forecasters
The extent of diﬀerences in opinion can be assessed by the cross-section variance of point forecasts
over individuals, i, and information vintages, j, that we denote Vij (fit−j,t+h). Using the standard
27variance decomposition formula leads to
Vij (fit−j,t+h) = Ej {Vi (fit−j,t+h|j)} + Vj {Ei (fit−j,t+h|j)}. (4)
This expressing underlies that the disagreement across individuals stems from two sources.
The ﬁrst source is the noise in individuals’ signal leading to diﬀerences in perception within a given
generation of forecasters j, i.e. Vi (fit−j,t+h|j) 6= 0. Within a generation of forecasters disagreement
is only generated by the variance of the individual noise, Σv. Indeed it holds that

















This cross section variance evolves with the forecast horizon, shrinking progressively to zero with
h. The ﬁrst term in total disagreement averages the vintage-j speciﬁc ‘within’ components of
disagreement described by equation(5). Each generation j is weighted by its relative share, λ(1−λ)j,
in the total population, so that
Ej {Vi (fit−j,t+h|j)} =
∞ X
j=0
(1 − λ)jλVi (fit−j,t+h|j). (6)
It is important to remark that this component of disagreement is not equal to zero, even when
λ = 1.
The second source comes from the diﬀerences in average opinion due to the diﬀerent information
vintages used by the forecasters, that is diﬀerences between generations of forecasters. Indeed,
within generation heterogeneity averages out in Ei (fit−j,t+h|j). So the only cross-section dispersion
remaining in the second term of equation (4) is due to diﬀerences in information vintage, j. More
precisely, we have




(1 − λ)jλEifit−j,t+h − Ej [Ei (fit−j,t+h|j)]
	2
. (7)
Unlike the ﬁrst component of disagreement of equation (6), this second component is equal to zero
when λ = 1.
4.1.5 Model properties
The above hybrid sticky/noisy information model can match several of the empirical regularities
documented in the previous section, namely predictable forecast errors and disagreement among
28forecasters updating their information. We now discuss the properties of some moments character-
izing the forecast error and disagreement and their relation to the inattention parameters, λ and
Σv.26
Properties of the average forecast errors The average forecast does not fully incorporate the
news released at date t, ηt. This leads to persistent forecast errors, as can be seen from equation (3).
A decrease in the attention degree, λ, increases both the persistence and the variance of forecast
error. An increase in a term on the ﬁrst diagonal of the noise variance matrix, Σv, increases the
persistence of the forecast error of the corresponding forecasted variable. It also increases the
variance of the forecast errors. All in all, less attention generates more persistence and variance of
the forecast errors.
Properties of the disagreement As equations (6) and (7) above show, the model generates
disagreement even under full information updating, λ = 1. In line with Mankiw-Reis model, dis-
agreement increases when λ decreases. Another important feature of the model is to generate
time-varying disagreement even when there is no time conditional heteroscedasticity in the mea-
surement error, vit so that Σv is constant across dates. This comes from the diﬀerences across
generations of forecasters. The degree of disagreement depends on the diﬀerence between the new
vintage of information and the previous one. If the last innovation is large compared to the average,
the diﬀerence of opinion between the individuals revising and the others, therefore the disagree-
ment, will be larger than the average one. This time variance of disagreement increases when λ
decreases.
An increase in any diagonal element of Σv has two diﬀerent eﬀects on the disagreement within a
generation of forecasters. On the one hand it increases the amount of noise, thus raises the diﬀer-
ences of opinions within the subgroup of forecasters that refer to the same vintage of information.
On the other hand, because individuals know that the signal is very imprecise, they incorporate
less the news to their forecast. In the extreme case, when the signal is completely uninformative,
the optimal forecast is the unconditional mean of the process for all forecasters, implying zero
disagreement.
26The discussion is based on simulations not reported in the paper to save space but available upon request.
29Lastly, the model structure also implies that the time variance of disagreement decays with the
variance of the noise. The less informative the news, the less they are incorporated in the optimal
forecast, therefore the less disagreement there is between generations of forecasters. In the extreme
case when precision of the signal approaches zero, news are uninformative so are not reﬂected in
the forecasts, and the time variance of the disagreement shrinks to zero.
4.2 Estimation procedure
We perform an estimation and a test of the previous model relying on a Minimum Distance Estima-
tion (MDE) procedure.27 The building blocks in this estimation procedure are ﬁrst, b µ, a vector of
K data-moments, such as average disagreement or average forecast error, which are computed from
the SPF panel data set, and, second, a corresponding set of model-generated moments µ(λ,Σv)
which are a function of the parameters λ and Σv. Estimates of the parameters λ and Σv are
produced by minimizing the following distance criteria:
[b µ − µ(λ,Σv)]
0 b Ω−1 [b µ − µ(λ,Σv)],
where b Ω is a consistent estimator of Ω, the asymptotic variance of b µ deﬁned by
√
T(b µ−µ) → N(0,Ω)
when T → ∞. In addition, letting θ = (λ, vec(Σv)) denote the parameters of interest, and b θ the
minimum distance estimator of θ, standard errors on the parameter estimate b θ can be implemented









with D ≡ D(θ) = Oθµ(θ) the Jacobian of µ(θ) with respect to θ evaluated at b θ. An estimator of
D0Ω−1D is given by b D0b Ω−1 b D where b D ≡ D(b θ).
The MDE procedure also allows to test for over-identifying restrictions, i.e. the null hypothe-
sis that the set of K moments µ can accurately be described with the P parameters to be es-
timated i.e. the elements of λ and Σv. The test statistic is given by the objective function
[b µ − µ(λ,Σv)]
0 b Ω−1 [b µ − µ(λ,Σv)]. Here, rather than relying on the asymptotic Chi-square distribu-
tion, we will use Monte Carlo simulations of the model to approximate the exact small distribution
of the test statistics.
27See for example Chapter 14 in Wooldridge (2002) for a general description of this method.
30The moments we select to deﬁne the objective function and estimate the model are guided by
the structural model of the above section. We consider moments related to forecast errors and
disagreement, since they are functions of attention rate and measurement error variance, thus
entailing econometric identiﬁcation. More precisely we select two moments related to forecast
errors: the mean square of forecast errors (MSE), E[ex
t,t+h)2] and the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of
forecast errors, ρx
e(1). We also consider two moments that are associated with disagreement: ﬁrst
the average level of disagreement, E(σt,h) and second the time variance of disagreement, V(σt,h).
Note that both the sticky information and the noisy information components of the model raise the
level of disagreement. On the contrary, only the sticky information model can predict a high level
of across time variance in disagreement. Thus this latter moment is particularly crucial in order to
discriminate among the two models. We carry out estimation using ﬁve alternative sets of these
moments, allowing to perform some robustness checks. The ﬁrst set is made of all four moments
mentioned above for both output and inﬂation, giving a total of eight target moments. The second
and third sets include these four moments respectively for inﬂation only and for output only. The
last two sets of moments are made of the mere disagreement moments, for output and inﬂation
respectively. These last two cases are thus just-identiﬁed.
The simulation of the model generated moments is carried out as follows. In a preliminary step, we
estimate an auxiliary model, a Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model for inﬂation, output growth
and unemployment. The VAR model include 4 lags and all variables are centered prior to estimation.
We use quarterly euro area data over the estimation period 1987:Q1 to 2009:Q2.28 The choice of the
sample period reﬂects a trade-oﬀ between conﬂicting objectives: ﬁrst, using a suﬃciently long time
series and second, considering an homogenous period in terms of monetary policy and the inﬂation
regime. Then taking the VAR parameters as given we perform simulation of moments in the
following way. For a set of structural parameters (λ, Σv), we use the Kalman ﬁlter and the hybrid
model of the previous section to generate average forecasts and forecasts errors given by equation
(3). At each date, we also use the formulae (4) to (7) to compute the level of disagreement for all
variables. We can thus deduce the standard deviation in disagreement over time. These moments
are compared to actual moments in order to compute a distance. Estimation is performed using a
numerical routine to minimize the objective function over the space of parameters. We restrict the
28We use the ECB AWM database.
31covariance matrix of the measurement error to Σv = σ2
vI3. Thus we assume that the variance of
the measurement error is common for inﬂation, unemployment and output growth. Experiments
relaxing the variance of the measurement errors for each of the variable led to broadly similar
results.
4.3 Results
Table (5) gives the estimation results. Five diﬀerent sets of estimates are presented, each corre-
sponding to a particular set of target moments. The ﬁrst case, reported in Column (1), uses the full
set of eight moments: for each variable, the considered moments are the average squared forecast
errors, E((ex
t,t+h)2], the degree of persistence, ρx
e(1), the average disagreement E(σx
t,h) and the time
variance in disagreement V(σx
t,h). The estimated value for σv the measurement noise, is 0.225 and
that for b λ, the attention parameter, is 0.054. This latter ﬁgure is lower than existing estimates of
the attention parameter obtained from time series evidence. For instance Mankiw et al. (2003),
on US data ﬁnd the best ﬁtting value for λ to be 0.27 (where we convert their monthly estimate
into a quarterly one). More strikingly, this ﬁgure is well below the micro estimate of around 0.75
obtained from the micro data in Section 3 above.29 Thus, along this ﬁrst dimension, the model is
at variance with the SPF micro facts. We also test for over-identifying constraints using the test
outlined above. The test rejects the null that the distance between the estimated moments and the
observed ones is zero, with a p-value of 0.04.
Column (2) presents results obtained when ﬁtting only the inﬂation moments as a target for es-
timation. The point estimates turn out to be very similar to the previous case, and the model is
rejected by the formal test at the 10% level, with a p-value of 0.07. Column (3) presents estimation
results obtained with only GDP moments. Here, the parameter estimates are even more extreme
with b λ = 0.023 and b σv = 0.563. A larger degree of noise is indeed needed to ﬁt the degree of dis-
agreement in output forecast, which is higher. In that exercise, which restricts to GDP moments,
the model is not rejected by the data (the p-value of the test is 0.96). However, the estimated
value for λ is well below our micro-data estimate. Lastly, columns (4) and (5) present models
29Due to the heterogeneity in λi we document in Section 3.5., and following the argument in Carvalho (2006) in the
case of the frequency of price adjustment, our estimation of the average attention rate may be prone to an aggregation
bias. However, since the lower bound in the λi is 50%, that aggregation bias would not be enough to reconcile the
MDE results with the micro data evidence.
32that are just-identiﬁed. They provide similar estimates of the attention degree as in the baseline
case, and larger estimates of the noise variance than the baseline case (b σv= 0.631 and b σv= 0.441
respectively). Overall, these estimates and tests suggest that our ﬂexible noisy information/sticky
information model fails to quantitatively ﬁt the data.
To illustrate what lies behind this formal rejection, Table (6) reports the set of target moments in
the SPF data and the same set of moments as generated by the model for diﬀerent values of the
parameters.30 Column (2) reports the moments generated by the model for the baseline estimated
values of parameters. For inﬂation, and even more for output, the level and the time variance of
disagreement predicted by the model is higher than that observed in the data (for instance average
disagreement about output is 0.362 in the data and 0.484 in the model). Conversely, for both
variables, the mean squared forecast error generated by the model is lower than that observed in
the data. The over-identifying restriction test indicates that these diﬀerences are signiﬁcative, so
even if ﬂexible the model cannot jointly ﬁt the two sets of moments. In essence, to ﬁt the observed
large degree of forecast error variance and persistence the model needs a very low degree of attention
λ. For this level of attention the degree of disagreement generated by the model turns out to be
much larger than that observed in the data.
The additional experiments reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table (6) further illustrate this
point. First, in column (3) we keep σv at the estimated value b σv, but set the attention degree λ
to a much higher value, here the value observed in the micro data λ = 0.75. We observe that the
disagreement for both output and inﬂation is lowered as compared with column (2). For instance,
disagreement in GDP moves from σGDP
t = 0.484 to σGDP
t = 0.443, therefore closer to the data
value of 0.362. However, at the same time, the mean squared forecast error generated by this degree
of attention degree is much too low to be in line with the data: for inﬂation, setting λ = 0.75 rather
than λ = b λ moves the model-generated mean squared forecast error from 0.529 to 0.145 while the
data value is 0.819. The variance of the noise is helpful in our model to generate high mean squared
forecast error. However there is a limit to this margin in terms of ﬁtting the data, as indicated by
our last experiment reported in Column (4). In this experiment we increase the standard deviation
of the noise to the value of σv = 1. As expected the MSE of forecast increases: for inﬂation it rises
30Values of the across-time variance of disagreement have been multiplied by 100 so that moments presented in
that table are of comparable magnitude.
33to 0.599. We might have expected that increasing σv would also increase disagreement because each
forecaster typically gets a signal farther from the true value of the state variable. However, another
mechanism, discussed in Section 4.1.5., counteracts this eﬀect: with a higher variance of the noise,
forecasters tend to shrink more their estimate of the state variable and put less emphasis on the
signal they perceive. It turns out that here the latter eﬀect dominates. For instance, in the case
of output, disagreement decreases from σGDP
t,h = 0.484 in the estimates to σGDP
t,h = 0.406. It is still
noticeable that such a level of noise variance is not optimal in terms of minimizing the distance
with observed moments. As indicated by the rows pertaining to the moment V(σt,h), the gap with
the data that emerges which such a level of noise variance is that it ﬂattens too much the time
pattern of disagreement. The model-generated values for time variance of disagreement are too low
in this experiment, while they were too high for more moderate values, in experiments of Columns
(2) and (3).
All in all, the sticky/noisy information model is rejected by our quantitative test because the
optimal (minimal distance) estimates of attention and noise parameters tend to generate too much
disagreement and not enough variance and persistence in forecast errors as compared with the data.
It remains to be understood why forecasters agree on sluggish revisions of their forecasts.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze an original data set, the European Survey of Professional Forecasters,
to characterize the formation of individual expectations with a particular emphasis on providing
micro facts relating to the sticky and noisy imperfect information models recently introduced in the
macroeconomic literature. In particular, we provide an estimate for the degree of attention based
on individual observations, and ﬁnd that professionals are, albeit mildly, inattentive. We also
document that, to a large extent, the disagreement among forecasters stays the same no matter
whether they revise their forecasts or not.
A formal test rejects a model of expectation featuring both sticky and noisy information. Indeed,
that model is not able to account for the strong persistence of the forecast errors together with the
relatively low level of disagreement between the forecasters observed in the data. There is more
34stickiness in experts’ expectations than the one the mere inattention is able to generate.
At least two avenues for future research are worthwhile considering. First more elaborate versions of
inattention models could be investigated. One could for example study how much of the discrepancy
between the data and our hybrid expectation model could be ﬁlled in by considering a degree of
attention that varies across individuals and over forecasting horizons, two features of the SPF
data we highlighted. One could also consider noisy signals that are common to every forecasters,
as a way to account for the low relatively low disagreement in the data. Second, and beyond
the mere framework of inattention theories, another avenue is to investigate whether alternative
forms of deviations from the perfect information rational expectation setup, for instance model
uncertainty or strategic interactions between forecasters, provide a better match of the empirical
patterns documented in this paper.
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38Table 1: Realizations, average forecasts & errors




Mean 2.32 8.23 2.18
Std Dev .63 .60 1.07
average forecasts, f
(Forecasting horizon: 1 year)
# of individuals 92 90 92
Mean 1.73 8.65 1.74
Std Dev .27 1.06 1.05
Resp. rate .57 .53 .56
average forecast errors, e
Mean .31 .04 -.36
RMSE .89 .75 1.62
MAE .66 .53 1.11
ρe(1) .735 .860 .841
average forecast efficiency test
ρe(h) -.906 .468 .218
p-value .052 .056 .253
Notes: All variables (except number of respondents)
are in %; HICP = euro area HICP inﬂation rate (yoy);
UNEM = euro area unemployment rate; RGDP =
euro area real GDP growth rate (yoy); ρe(h) = h-
order autocorrelation of the error; p-values are com-
puted using a robust Newey-West covariance matrix.



























Notes: All variables are in %; HICP = euro area HICP in-
ﬂation rate (yoy); UNEM = euro area unemployment rate;
RGDP = euro area real GDP growth rate (yoy); σt = dis-
agreement across forecasters; ∆xt = change in forecasted
variable; ∆ft change in the average forecast; et = average
forecast error; all regressions include a constant term; num-
bers in brackets are standard errors of estimates using a ro-
bust Newey-West procedure; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicates signiﬁcance
at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.




Mean(e) .31 .04 -.36
Mean(λcal) .71 .74 .80
Mean(λrol) .88 .95 .94
Mean(λrol,q) .41 .53 .51
Mean(σ) .26 .26 .33
Std Dev(x) .62 .60 1.07
conditional proba of updating
P(∆fy|∆fx)
HICP 1 .878 .877
UNEM .951 1 .944
RGDP .939 .938 1
Notes: All variables are in %; HICP = euro area
HICP inﬂation rate (yoy); UNEM = euro area unem-
ployment rate; RGDP = euro area real GDP growth
rate (yoy); e forecast error; λ = frequency of changing
forecast; σ disagreement; x = forecasted variable; ∆f
= revision of forecast; P(∆fy|∆fx) = probability to
revise y forecast (in line) conditional on revising x (in
column).


















Notes: All variables are in %; HICP = euro area
HICP inﬂation rate (yoy); UNEM = euro area unem-
ployment rate; RGDP = euro area real GDP growth
rate (yoy); λi = individual probability to update its
forecast; ei = average forecast errors; ∆fi = average
forecast revision; all regressions include a constant
term; numbers in brackets are std error of estimates;
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10%
levels respectively.
Table 5: Minimum Distance Estimation and Tests
Selected moments






















J-stat 135.2 29.5 .22
p-value .04 .07 .96
Notes: Table reports MDE estimates (with standard errors
in brackets) & test statistics. et denotes date t average er-
ror, ρe(1) its ﬁrst-order autocorrelation and σt the date t
disagreement across forecasters. Matched moments are (1):
E(e2
t), ρe(1), E(σt), V(σt) for π and ∆y; (2): E(e2
t), ρe(1),
E(σt), V(σt) for π; (3): E(e2
t), ρe(1), E(σt), V(σt) for ∆y;
(4): E(σt), V(σt) for π; (5): E(σt), V(σt) for ∆y.
42Table 6: Model generated moments
Moments under various conﬁgurations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Data λ = .b λ λ = .75 λ = b λ
σ = b σ σ = b σ σ = 1
inflation, π
E(e2
t) .819 .529 .145 .599
ρe(1) .781 .806 .537 .822
E(σt) .272 .278 .228 .235
V(σt) .624 .880 .458 .421
real gdp, ∆y
E(e2
t) 2.722 2.194 .413 2.539
ρe(1) .873 .783 .431 .786
E(σt) .362 .484 .443 .406
V(σt) 2.685 6.238 3.653 1.481
Notes: Table reports various moments of inﬂation, π, and
real GDP growth rate, ∆y, obtained with MDE estimates
or alternate parameters values. et denotes date t average
error, ρe(1) its ﬁrst-order autocorrelation and σt the date t
disagreement across forecasters.
43Figure 1: Consensus forecast & realizations
44Figure 2: Cross-section distribution of RGDP 1-year forecasts (1999:Q1–2003:Q4)
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49Figure 5: Evolution of attention
50Figure 6: The eﬀect of rounding: 1-year, HICP
51Figure 7: Disagreement among revisers
52Figure 8: Cross-section distribution of errors, attention rates & revisions; HICP, 1-year
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